decisions on a second front

  • before 1943
    • SU desperate in need for Allied help
    • Stalin bringing up the topic
  • Churchill unwilling b/c fear of failure of another Dieppe raid
  • depended on UK to provide the land troop
  • US & UK to not launch attack in 1942
  • May 1943
    • Stalin - Churchill for the 3rd time attempted to delay second front to 1 May 1944
    • but overruled by FDR
    • Churchill
      • dreaded failure and loss of lives
      • no more British glories!
  • US military leaders knew the need for SU alliance

Bretton Woods conference

  • gov. to call IMF (International Monetary Fund) for help
    • for macro-economics
  • $ replace pound for world’s main currency
  • World Bank
    • for micro developmental projects
  • transfer of economic power from UK to US
  • declare gold reserves and inspections to request loans

US-SU discussions on credits

  • SU: export raw materials and import industrial goods
  • US doubts:
    • old and coal industry competitions
    • Kennan - SU’s huge purchasing power to exploit US industry
  • failed b/c:
    • Congress not accepting post-war credits when war still going on
    • reserves of Export-Import Bank almost exhausted
    • proposed 3.375 interest rate Lend Lease
    • SU refused b/c too high -> asked for 2.25 %
      • Congress unwilling to lend beyond end of hostilities + larger voices for SU political concessions

Conflict over Germany

European Advisory commission (EAC)

  • to advise SU, UK, US on ANY conflicting interests
  • US and SU refuse to discuss post-war settlements b/c unforeseeable

Yalta

  • Stalin demanded $20 billion for SU and Germany’s victims

East and south-east Europe problem

US taken for granted

  • the states to follow the Atlantic Charter: self-determination + democracy + market economy

FDR: no discussion of post-war settlements / territorial gains before war ends!

  • refused / ignored Churchill & British gov.’s demands to accept SU territorial requests
  • disliked the % agreements
  • Stalin response: unilateral agreement ignoring West

pressure from pro-Western and minorities in eastern Europe

  • US to adhere to the Atlantic Charter

Yalta

  • Stalin more understanding and agreed to publish the ‘Declaration on Liberated Europe’
  • both Lublin committee and London Poles recognized & Polish gov. organized elections
  • overwhelming optimism in the US

FDR’s foreign policies

  • universalism rather than isolationaism
    • liberal capitalism everywhere
    • no more spheres of influence by self-determination
  • SU genuinely hoping for collaboration
    • acceptance of SU spheres of influence + US technology

change of office

  • Truman and Attlee less tolerating Stalin’s spheres of influence (Allies handed Bulgaria quietly to Stalin at Potsdam)
    • Potsdam - Truman already on office

Oder-Neisse line: border between Poland & Germany

Poland

  • Provisional Government claiming territories with Yalta still going on
  • 21 April 1945 SU treaty of friendship
    • Western refused Poland admission to consultative meeting of the UN

FDR

personality: more subtle

  • master of ambiguity
  • knows how to charm the SU
  • how to maintain the Big 3’s relations

the Atomic Bomb

FDR: Manhattan Project sanctioned only to not let Germany the first

Truman: sanctioned the dropping on Japan

  • controversial
  • advised by James F. Byrnes
    • tough attitude to Japan -> need no mercy!
    • no shared secret

Japanese ruthlessness at US

  • wanted mediation on terms without surrender, occupation, or changes in the imperial system

SU, Manchuria and Korea

Manchuria & Korea as a buffer zone for SU between Japan

US wanted civil war between Guomindang and communists to end -> don’t want to be involved in it

Kim Il Sung

  • served under SU command to unify Korea

Syngman Rhee

ROK founded August 1948

North Korea highly industrialized than the south

  • due to Japanese occupation

US changing attitudes

  1. whole Americans in contact w/ SU
    1. SU thought as invaded by barbaric Asians
    2. British & SU conflict over maltreatment of German women
      1. rape exeeded 2 million including Ukrainian and Polish women forced
  2. astonishment and resentment at SU behavior promoted ‘Riga axioms’
    1. & questions of FDR’s foreign policies
  3. adopted Riga axiom
    1. US underestimated SU security needs in eastern Europe & overestimated SU’s will to expand
    2. domino theory
      1. possible proof: SU demands for military bases in the Straits and a mandate in Libya
    3. world falling to SU if US not prevent
      1. eastern Europe example
    4. economic crisis in Europe -> possible political revolution and communist infiltration!
  4. Truman - amateur in foreign diplomacy
    1. Wilsonian but gave up on FDR’s politics; turned realistic
      1. on ‘important matters’ the Americans ‘should be able to get 85 per cent’ of what they want

cooperation & pressure

US public: ‘Bring the boys home’

  • no more sacrifices!

US&UK tension

  • Truman to Churchill, asking for private meeting w/ Stalin
    • Churchill protested but Truman went on as still
  • Truman recognized Poland’s new gov.
    • irritated Churchill
  • State Department against UK’s aim for a western European bloc b/c it reduced free trade

Truman & Stalin’s private conversation

  • treating as friends
  • Stalin convinced US friendship & went on to take eastern Europe & other parts
    • Soviet-Turkish alliance to return Turkey to SU territory
  • Truman refused to recognize Romania and Bulgaria gov.
    • need self-determination & free elections!

US changed their mind toward the end of the Potsdam conference

  • SU reparations + capital equipments from Germany’s western zone
  • Oder-Neisse line
  • recognition of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland on top priority
  • good impression until failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London Sep. 1945

Lend-Lease deliveries ended abruptely and enraged SU

  • US: reparation as low as possible to recover market economy

Yalta agreements & different interpretations of democracy

SU request on credits

  • only allowed on concession for:
    • guaranteed US property
    • distribution of US media
    • freedom of religion
    • press
    • genuine free election

dilemma at the 4 policemen dream

  • how to reconcile a realistic foreign policy abroad with an indealistic foreign policy at home

failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers 11 September - 2 October 1945

Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers meeting December 1945

  • some concessions

pressure on Byrnes

  • difficult to convince the American public that his foreign policies followed the Atlantic Charter
  • concession at the Moscow conference
    • 2 non-communist miniters to Romania & Bulgaria gov. = US recognition
    • Truman exasperated & tired of concessions
    • ‘I do not think we should play compromise any longer… I’m tired of babying the Soviets’
  • Byrnes - Secretary of State

1945 & reasons for Cold War

  1. 1945; US policy changed
    1. SU policy remained on seeking agreements until autumn 1947
  2. change of US policy due to SU behavior in eastern Europe
    1. largely due to A bomb
    2. US duty to protect the small countries (went to WW2 to protect them from Nazi)
  3. incompatibility of US and SU views
    1. possible for socialist Europe
      1. if US exported capitals throughout Europe & pulled out the troops
  4. US underestimation of SU security needs
    1. refused to cooperate -> SU to view US policies as aggressive capitalist expansionism
  5. US multiplicity of views
    1. unclear what its interests & policies should be at any given moment
    2. no clear vision for the Germany question
    3. SU gov. difficult to judge US intentions genuine or test
  6. Molotov’s personality
    1. wanted too much of SU goodness and failed to charm
    2. distrust on both sides
    3. but partly due to detailed instructions by Stalin