Stalin to “Politburo four” Deecmber 9, 1945

Main message:

  • tenacity in policy against the SU
  • Yugoslavia, Bulgaria as SU spheres of influence
  • retreat of USA
    • war like language
    • stressing on struggles
  • instructions to be tenacious
    • but not necessarily to be aggressive

Molotov to Stalin 8 June 1946

Views on the disarmament and demilitarization policies of Germany and Japan:

  1. reduce duration of Germany’s occupation
    1. US to continue demanding withdrawals of SU troops from eastern Europe
    2. SU to weaken reactionary forces
  2. disrupt German reparations to SU
    1. vital to SU recovery post-war
    2. US: repair German economy!
      1. to not borrow from US and UK; and make Germany able to buy things from them
      2. avoid mistakes of WW1
  3. reduce SU influence on Germany and other European countries
    1. peace-loving US and cold-hearted SU
  4. speed up Germany’s reconstruction to use Germany against the SU
    1. ignoring the key disarmament goals
      1. German industries still possible for arm production
      2. bypasses the agreements at Yalta and Potsdam
      3. no key de-nazification; only controlled the disarmaments
    2. restore it to bourgeoise and capitalist state and reliance on US
    3. replacement of political domination by economic domination

Nikolai Novikov report 27 September 1946

US for world supremacy

US to infiltrate post-war recovery states requiring capital goods, consumer goods, etc.

Naval and aerial supremacy of US - PaxAmericana

  • paid to protect commerce

failure of US calculation on the recovery of SU

  • SU refusing US aids
  • the high confidence that US in a much higher position
  • SU more economically independent
  • SU stronger international reputations
    • image as the victim
    • larger occupation region
      • reparations from the Western regions

changing of leaders

  • SU more favoring Democrats
  • Roosevelt -> Truman
    • Truman - conservative democratic

SU international positions strengthened

  • due to control of previously hostile countries
    • e.g. Polish border, Germany, etc.

US to increase military potentials in peacetime

  • universal military service in peace time
  • offensive nature of the strategic concepts
    • US bases on islands far away to US and close to the SU
  • US & UK previously negotiated to partition Far East
    • later US not interested to helping UK
    • interests in oil and natural resources in Mediterranean basin and Near East
      • to ensure that the seas are open
  • Turkey straits
    • increase domination
    • threatens SU
  • no longer following policy-lines of collaboration among the Allies

SU democratizating the eastern Europe

  • US to interfere and obstruct with the process of SU democratization

US press to make American people an atmosphere of war psychosis

SU as main obstacle to path of US of world domination

US huge military budgets

advice of closing down Britansky Soyuznik 2 November 1946

SU losing the economic arguments to capitalism

  • to hide the fact that capitalism has higher standards of living
  • shows the SU easiness to be influenced by immature communications and policies
    • anything can be achieved easily by pretext of SU benefits

direction to SU delegates to the Paris conference discussing US aid

interest in the aid but cautious to make it about individual bases, not about Europe recovery as a whole

priority to those European countries subject to German occupation

to stop US attempts to support Germany

SU to portray US as the imperative, and if any state accepts the Marshall Plan it will be be slavery and losing sovereignty