在首席执行官 Muilenburg 被解雇之后，制造业专家们开始关注失误、被低估的问题，以及供应商和美国经济将面临的问题。
Laura Putre 劳拉 · 普特
DEC 24, 2019 2019年12月24日
It’s been the longest year ever for 103-year-old Boeing, after two 737 Max jet crashes attributed to similar issues with sensor and software design killed 347 people. The investigation is ongoing, and the fallout, pressure and scrutiny into Boeing’s operations have grounded hundreds of planes, caused chaos for airlines and now are bringing Boeing production lines to a halt.
这是有103年历史的波音公司历史上飞行时间最长的一年，两架波音737 Max 飞机因为传感器和软件设计的类似问题坠毁，造成347人死亡。 调查仍在进行中，波音公司的运营受到的影响、压力和监督已经导致数百架飞机停飞，给航空公司造成了混乱，现在波音公司的生产线也停止了运营。
In light of the firing yesterday of Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg—who has been widely criticized for a host of issues including a culture of profits at all costs and not grounding planes sooner—we asked two manufacturing leadership veterans to take stock of the past year in Boeing news and where the aerospace giant goes from here
昨天波音公司首席执行官丹尼斯·米伦伯格被解雇—— 他因为一系列问题受到广泛批评，包括不惜一切代价追求利润的文化和没有尽早停飞飞机—— 我们请两位制造业领导层的资深人士回顾过去一年的波音新闻，以及这家航空业巨头今后的走向
Jamie Flinchbaugh is a lean leadership consultant, co-founder of the Lean Learning Center and author of The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Lean. He has held lean leadership roles at Chrysler and DTE Energy.
杰米 · 弗林茨堡是一位精益领导力顾问，精益学习中心的联合创始人，《精益指南》的作者。 他在克莱斯勒和 DTE 能源公司担任过精干的领导职务。
Dave Nolletti is a director at Conway MacKenzie, specializing in aerospace and defense. A commercial pilot who has flown for the military, he has worked directly with Boeing and their suppliers for the past 18 years. Prior to his consulting work, he worked as a global market research manager for Procter & Gamble.
Dave Nolletti 是 Conway MacKenzie 公司的主管，专攻航空航天和国防。 作为一名为军方服务的商业飞行员，他在过去的18年里一直直接与波音公司及其供应商合作。 在从事咨询工作之前，他曾在宝洁公司做全球市场研究经理。
On Muilenburg’s firing:
关于穆伦堡的解雇:
DN: I think that the timing of his departure probably could have been accelerated. You look at the series of programmatic mishaps that Boeing has endured over the last five or six years, and the 737 Max is really the last of four or five that you can put your finger on where the company just hasn’t performed up to its own historical standards
丹: 我认为他离开的时间可能被加快了。 看看波音公司在过去五六年里经历的一系列程序上的失误，737max 确实是四五款中最后一款，你可以指出公司在哪些方面没有达到自己的历史标准
JF: In general, you don’t want the CEO of a multi-division company like Boeing having to pay attention to what are essentially new features launched in derivative products. Like at no point should the CEO be overseeing the specifics of, this was a feature, it wasn’t a new aircraft it was a derivative aircraft and it was a new feature launched on that derivative aircraft. If the CEO paid attention to all of those—I mean they have to launch a couple hundred every year—there’s no way they’re doing their job. Then it begs the question, is this a one-off issue that was poorly executed, or symptomatic of a systemic culture of design and carelessness and other issues. Nobody’s really pointed to anything that says it’s a broader issue yet, which is where I would like to see the deeper story go.
简. 方达: 一般来说，你不希望像波音这样的多部门公司的首席执行官不得不关注衍生产品本质上的新特性。 首席执行官在任何时候都不应该监督具体细节，这是一个功能，它不是一个新的飞机，它是一个衍生飞机，它是一个新的功能推出的衍生飞机。 如果首席执行官关注所有这些(我的意思是，他们每年不得不推出几百个) ，他们就不可能做好自己的工作。 那么这就引出了一个问题，这是一个执行不力的一次性问题，还是设计和粗心大意等问题的系统文化的症状。 到目前为止，还没有人真正指出这是一个更广泛的问题，这也是我想看到更深层次的故事发展的地方。
I do think they were right to move on, because even if a CEO deserves no blame, it’s really hard for to move on without them leaving. We see this in sports all the time. It could be bad players on the field, and the manager couldn’t turn it around, but at some point if that’s the only story, you have to pull the trigger anyway.
我确实认为他们继续前进是正确的，因为即使 CEO 不应该受到责备，如果他们不离开，那么继续前进真的很难。 我们经常在体育运动中看到这种情况。 这可能是场上糟糕的球员，教练无法扭转局面，但是在某种程度上，如果这是唯一的故事，你不得不扣动扳机。
My only hope is in the firing of the CEO, is they don’t then declare, “OK, we’ve fired the culprit now we’re clean.” I would rather they do a deep study and then declare how they’ve fixed their system if they find real problems.
我唯一的希望就是首席执行官被解雇，他们不会随后宣布，“好吧，我们解雇了罪魁祸首，现在我们清白了。” 我宁愿他们做一个深入的研究，然后宣布他们如何修复他们的系统，如果他们发现真正的问题。
On the path forward for incoming CEO David Calhoun:
在即将上任的 CEO 大卫 · 卡尔霍恩的未来之路上:
JF: Well, for one, and this is a pet peeve of mine about being overstretched, will he step down as lead outside director at Caterpillar? These are both pretty serious jobs and you can’t do both at the same time. And I would start a systematic study—whether it be outside resources or carved out full time internal resources to study the design system—how is it working, how do things come to bear, is there a systematic problem or not … I would also work to clean up the discipline and at least confidence in the integrity of manufacturing, if for no other reason that it’s now become a public spotlight issue and needs to be addressed, even if it is irrelevant to the 737 Max crash.
简. 方达: 嗯，首先，这是我对过度紧张的一个讨厌的地方，他会辞去卡特彼勒外部主管的职务吗？ 这些都是相当严肃的工作，你不能同时做这两件事。 我会开始一个系统性的研究—— 无论是外部资源还是全职的内部资源来研究设计系统—— 它是如何工作的，事情是如何产生的，是否存在系统性的问题… … 我也会努力清理纪律，至少对制造业的诚信有信心，如果没有其他原因，它现在已经成为公众关注的焦点问题，需要加以解决，即使它与737 Max 的崩溃无关。
DN: He will likely continue along the same path that Mr. [James] McNerney [Boeing CEO from 2005 to 2015] and Mr. Muilenburg pursued. So l don’t’ see a big change in the way Boeing’s conducting themselves or the way they operate their business.
丹: 他很可能会沿着詹姆斯 · 麦克纳尼先生(2005年至2015年波音公司首席执行官)和穆伦伯格先生追求的道路继续前进。 所以我不认为波音公司的行为方式和经营方式有什么大的改变。
On stronger candidates to lead Boeing:
关于领导波音公司的更强大的候选人:
DN: Boeing has a reputational issue now, both with the regulatory agencies around the world and with the flying public and with the airlines. So they need someone that knows operations, knows how the industry works but also someone that is credible to the workforce, the regulatory agencies and the customer base. I think that there are a couple people that are currently working in aerospace. [Former Ford CEO and former Boeing president of commercial airplanes] Alan Mulally is a name that comes to mind. He got passed over for the job and I think if he were available or interested he would be a prime candidate. He’s demonstrated he knows the industry and he can run the business.
波音公司现在有一个声誉问题，与世界各地的监管机构，与飞行的公众和航空公司。 因此，他们需要一个了解运营、了解行业运作方式的人，但也需要一个对员工、监管机构和客户基础可信的人。 我认为有几个人目前在航空航天领域工作。 (福特前首席执行官和前波音商用飞机总裁)艾伦 · 穆拉利是一个浮现在脑海中的名字。 他没有得到这份工作，我认为如果他有空或者有兴趣的话，他会是一个首选人选。 他已经证明了他了解这个行业，他能够经营这个行业。
Or maybe someone like Kelly Ortberg, the president of Collins Aerospace. He was chairman, president and CEO of Rockwell Collins before they were acquired by UTC. He’s another professional that has just an outstanding reputation in the industry.
或者像柯林斯航空公司总裁凯利 · 奥特伯格这样的人。 在罗克韦尔柯林斯被 UTC 收购之前，他是该公司的董事长、总裁和首席执行官。 他是另一位在业内享有盛誉的专业人士。
On Muilenberg’s biggest misstep:
关于 Muilenberg 最大的失误:
DN: I think if you trace the Max program back, the initial decision made inside of Boeing was whether or not you design a new aircraft and bring it to market, or you try and upgrade the 737. That was a long discussion inside of Boeing and it was followed in the media pretty closely. Upgrading the existing 737, that presented some really practical engineering problems for how to do it. The engines on the Max are much larger, high-thrust engines. Just getting them under the wing and maintaining ground clearance was a very practical issue. I think Boeing chose to upgrade the engine to the Max because they did not want to undertake the expense and the risk of engineering an all-new airplane. And that decision at the outset I really think set the program up for these kinds of issues that they’re dealing with now.
丹: 我认为如果你追溯麦克斯计划，波音公司内部最初的决定是你是否设计一架新飞机并投放市场，或者你尝试升级737。 这是波音公司内部的一个长时间的讨论，媒体也对此进行了密切关注。 升级现有的波音737，提出了一些真正实际的工程问题，如何做到这一点。 在最大的发动机是更大，高推力的发动机。 只是让他们在机翼下面和保持离地间隙是一个非常实际的问题。 我认为波音选择升级发动机到最大，因为他们不想承担费用和风险，设计一个全新的飞机。 一开始的那个决定，我真的认为是为他们现在正在处理的这些问题，设定了一个计划。
On quality problems reported at Boeing’s Charleston, South Carolina and Renton, Washington, plants:
关于波音公司(Boeing)查尔斯顿、南卡罗来纳州和伦顿的工厂报告的质量问题:
JF: The part that gets me tripped up, there’s lots of noise about production conditions and overtime, and pushing the schedule. Yet the actual crash has been what seems to be clearly identified, including by Boeing and the FAA to be a [software] design flaw, which has nothing to do with anything happening in a factory. And so is all the noise about production conditions related to a broader cultural problem of lack of attention to detail and discipline and decision-making that spans both design and production? Or is it completely a red herring and unrelated to any real issues Boeing has.
简. 方达: 让我感到困惑的部分是，有很多关于生产条件和加班的噪音，还有推动进度的噪音。 然而，实际的坠机事件似乎已经被清楚地确认，包括波音和美国联邦航空管理局(FAA)认为是一个(软件)设计缺陷，与工厂里发生的任何事情都没有关系。 那么，所有关于生产条件的争论是否都与一个更广泛的文化问题有关，即缺乏对细节、纪律和跨越设计和生产的决策的关注？ 或者，这完全是在转移视线，与波音公司的任何实际问题无关。
If you have hundreds or thousands of people and thousands of parts coming together, in the end, there’s a lot of things that have to happen, and a lot of things can seem on the surface to be carelessness or other attributes. But when it’s that many people and that many parts, of course if you look you’re going to find some problems.
如果你有成百上千的人和成千上万的部件聚集在一起，最终，会有很多事情发生，很多事情表面上看起来是粗心大意或者其他属性。 但是当这么多的人和这么多的部分，当然，如果你仔细观察，你会发现一些问题。
The sources of evidence were limited. And so it’s hard to say whether that’s really reflective of the whole factory on a day-to-day basis. There are certainly concerns, but again, I could go into any factory and find enough reasons to tell them they should shut down because it’s a mess. It’s the complexity of manufacturing with that many people and that much stuff going on and that many decisions. … Probably no factory in the world, I couldn’t go in and say you have some problem, but your job is to fix them. I think the response is more important than the issues themselves.
证据来源有限。 因此，很难说这是否真正反映了整个工厂的日常基础。 当然有一些担忧，但是，我可以再次走进任何一家工厂，找到足够的理由告诉他们，他们应该关闭，因为这是一团糟。 这就是制造业的复杂性，有那么多的人，那么多的东西，那么多的决定。 … … 世界上可能没有工厂，我不能进去说你有什么问题，但你的工作是解决它们。 我认为应对措施比问题本身更重要。
DN: My knowledge of Charleston is it’s exclusively 787. Which 787 is a predominately carbon fiber aircraft and the processes are new. So I would expect there to be some learning going on there. But I didn’t really hear anything about manufacturing that alarmed me as someone that’s worked in the supply chain. I think you expect there to be problems. Not so much problems that contributed to safety, but things that are just unexpected that the company has to deal with.
我对查尔斯顿的了解仅限于787。 其中787是一个主要的碳纤维飞机和工艺是新的。 所以我希望在那里能学到一些东西。 但是我并没有听到任何关于制造业的消息，作为一个在供应链中工作的人，这些消息让我感到恐慌。 我想你预料到会有问题。 并不是太多的安全问题，而是公司不得不处理的意想不到的事情。
On the best path forward for Boeing suppliers:
关于波音供应商的最佳前进道路:
DN: I think a lot of middle-market companies started their contingency planning for this kind of event early, trying to get their balance sheet in order, which means controlling working capital, inventory, getting their banking relationships and their credit facilities ready for the shock of the shutdown. They’re going to have to figure out to cover their debts with significantly lower revenues, with the 737 shutdown. If you’re a company that derives 60% of your revenues from Boeing and half of it just goes away because the 737 gets shut down, that’s going to make for some very, very difficult cash flow months.
我认为很多中间市场的公司早就开始为这类事件做应急计划，试图让他们的资产负债表恢复正常，这意味着要控制营运资金、库存、与银行的关系以及信贷设施，以应对政府关门带来的冲击。 他们将不得不想办法用收入明显减少的737关闭来偿还债务。 如果你的公司60% 的收入来自波音公司，一半的收入因为波音737的关闭而消失，那么这将会给你带来非常非常困难的几个月的现金流。
So if I were a middle-market supplier, that’s what I would be focusing on right now. How do I position myself to survive? To be able to meet my fixed charges, to be able to pay my lenders, to be able to pay my employees and still operate a business. They’re in survival mode.
所以如果我是一个中等市场的供应商，这就是我现在要关注的。 我该如何定位自己以求生存？ 能够支付我的固定费用，能够支付我的债权人，能够支付我的雇员和仍然经营一个企业。 他们处于生存模式。
No matter how swiftly they move to diversify and bring in new business, there’s going to be a period of time when the revenue and the cash flow isn’t there, and that’s really the difficult time they need to prepare for. And when it comes back into production, it creates even more working capital demands on the company.
不管他们多么迅速地进行多样化投资并引入新的业务，总会有一段时间收入和现金流都不存在，这确实是他们需要准备的困难时期。 当它重新投入生产时，会给公司带来更多的营运资金需求。
On the best-case scenario for Boeing:
对波音来说，最好的情况是:
DN: They get the aircraft recertified and back in the air in the second quarter, 2020. You’re probably looking at a three- to four-year period, where they ramp production back up to 52 a month where they were.
丹: 2020年第二季度，他们对飞机进行了重新认证，然后重新起飞。 你可能需要三到四年的时间，他们会把产量提高到原来的每月52美元。
On the impact of Boeing shutdown on the US economy:
关于波音停飞对美国经济的影响:
DN: Boeing dollar-wise, is the largest exporter in the country. I don’t know if a lot of the public realizes how many hundreds of thousands of people work in the supply chain for Boeing in this country. It is an enormous industry and you think about how shutting plants down or furloughing employees as the supply base grapples with the problem, how that’s going to affect working people in this country, it is a very big deal, and not just at the publicly traded company level but certainly for companies much smaller than that. If you look at all the big aerospace clusters in the country—Los Angeles; Seattle; Wichita, Kansas; St. Louis; Long Island; Charleston; Connecticut; Dallas-Fort Worth—there is exposure across the country, not just Seattle.
就美元而言，波音是美国最大的出口商。 我不知道是否有很多公众意识到这个国家有多少成千上万的人在波音的供应链上工作。 这是一个庞大的行业，你会想到，作为供应基础，关闭工厂或者解雇员工是如何应对这个问题的，这将如何影响这个国家的劳动人民，这是一个非常大的问题，不仅仅是在公开交易的公司层面，而且肯定是对于比这小得多的公司。 如果你看看美国所有的大型航空航天企业集群——洛杉矶、西雅图、堪萨斯州威奇托、圣路易斯、长岛、查尔斯顿、康涅狄格、达拉斯-沃思堡——它们的业务遍及全国，而不仅仅是西雅图。

波音公司领导层的失败

Dec. 20, 2019 9:23 AM ET 2019年12月20日美国东部时间上午9:23
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About: 关于: The Boeing Company (BA) 波音公司(BA), Includes: 包括:GE 通用电气, MSFT 微波辐射测量

John M. Mason 约翰 · m · 梅森
Banks, long-term horizon 银行，长远的眼光

Summary 摘要
Boeing’s business model has not worked and, consequently, its failures have impacted a spreading circle of victims and now seems to be spreading to the wider economy.
波音公司的商业模式一直不起作用，因此，它的失败已经影响了一个不断扩大的受害者圈子，现在似乎正在向更广泛的经济领域蔓延。
Criticism has been aimed at Boeing’s emphasis on shareholder returns in the near term at the expense of building a longer-term culture of “engineering excellence.”
批评的矛头指向波音强调短期内的股东回报，而忽视了建立一种长期的“卓越工程”文化
Satya Nadella, CEO of Microsoft, can be cited as an example of how one can build a corporate culture that focuses upon longer-term relevance, something that also creates longer-term value.
微软(Microsoft)首席执行官萨蒂亚•纳德拉(Satya Nadella)可以作为一个例子，说明如何建立一种注重长期相关性的企业文化，这种文化也能创造长期价值。
Mr. Nadella has just been named Person of the Year by the Financial Times for his rebuilding the culture of Microsoft, which has also returned Microsoft to the heights of corporate valuation.
纳德拉先生刚刚被英国《金融时报》评为年度人物，因为他重建了微软的文化，这也使微软重新回到了公司估值的高度。
The lead editorial in the Financial Times reads “Boeing Needs to Transform the Way It Operates.”
英国《金融时报》的主要社论写道: “波音需要改变其运营方式。”
The leadership failure at Boeing Co. (NYSE: BA) first impacted people that flew on the airline, it has impacted thousands of staff and suppliers, and it is on the way toward impacting the whole American economy.
波音公司(NYSE: BA)领导层的失败首先影响了乘坐该航空公司飞机的人，影响了成千上万的员工和供应商，而且正在影响整个美国经济。
Many critics point to the Boeing example and say that this is another failure of the capitalistic economic model. The story is that greedy executives drive a company to maximize the company’s stock price and thereby maximize shareholder wealth.
许多评论家以波音公司为例，说这是资本主义经济模式的又一个失败。 故事是这样的，贪婪的管理者驱使公司最大化公司的股票价格，从而最大化股东的财富。
The editors of the Financial Times echo these failures in criticizing the current CEO, Dennis Muilenburg as helping Boeing “perpetuate a culture focused on shareholder returns rather than engineering excellence, one divorced from its manufacturing base in Seattle.”
英国《金融时报》的编辑们重复了这些批评的失败之处，他们批评现任首席执行官丹尼斯·米伦伯格 · 波音帮助波音“延续了一种注重股东回报而非卓越工程的文化，这种文化与波音在西雅图的制造
Furthermore, “the board also failed to ask hard questions.”
此外，“董事会也没有提出尖锐的问题。”
But, the editors go on, the fault does not lie entirely on Boeing’s management. “Aviation safety regulators, in particular America’s Federal Aviation Administration, were initially accused of being slow to act and have been under pressure to take a tough line…”
但是，编辑们继续说道，错误并不完全在于波音公司的管理。 “航空安全监管机构，尤其是美国联邦航空管理局(Federal Aviation Administration) ，最初被指行动迟缓，并面临采取强硬立场的压力… … ”
To me, the failure is not just because of the capitalistic system nor is it because people are greedy.
对我来说，失败不仅仅是因为资本主义制度，也不是因为人们的贪婪。
People are greedy and will always be greedy.
人们是贪婪的，永远是贪婪的。
The capitalistic system, still, in my mind is the best system around, but it is also true that some changes might improve the way it functions. We know that even in a capitalistic society, regulators and regulations are necessary. Executives and companies do cut corners.
在我看来，资本主义制度仍然是最好的制度，但同样真实的是，一些变化可能会改善它的运作方式。 我们知道，即使在资本主义社会，监管和管制也是必要的。 高管和公司确实偷工减料。
If the Boeing problem were just one of regulators not doing their job, then we know where the problem lies.
如果波音公司的问题只是监管机构没有尽到自己的职责，那么我们就知道问题在哪里了。
The regulators must do their job. There is no question, as the editorial suggests, that the regulators must address what a company is doing and determine whether or not they contributed to the breakdown of the system leading to the problems that followed.
监管机构必须做好自己的工作。 毫无疑问，正如社论建议的那样，监管机构必须解决一家公司正在做的事情，并确定它们是否促成了系统的崩溃，从而导致了随之而来的问题。
The real issue, to me, however, boils down to one about information and how open and transparent a management is, not only with its regulators, but with its customers, with its shareholders, with its suppliers, and with its board.
然而，对我来说，真正的问题在于信息，以及管理层的公开和透明度，不仅在于管理层，还在于其客户、股东、供应商和董事会。
In fact, the whole issue here gets back to the culture created by the leaders of the company… and specifically to the CEO of the company.
事实上，这里的所有问题都回到了公司领导创造的文化上… 尤其是公司的 CEO。
In this, I agree with the statement cited above in the editorial: Boeing needs to “perpetuate a culture focused on… engineering excellence.”
在这一点上，我同意社论中引用的声明: 波音公司需要“延续一种注重优秀工程的文化”
This is what will create shareholder value. But, even more important, this is what will create sustainable shareholder value.
这将创造股东价值。 但更重要的是，这将创造可持续的股东价值。
It is interesting that the editors of the Financial Times put out the editorial on Boeing at the same time the paper presented the FT Person of the Year award. This year’s choice is Satya Nadella, the chief executive officer of Microsoft Corp. (NASDAQ: MSFT).
有趣的是，英国《金融时报》的编辑们在该报颁发“英国《金融时报》年度人物奖”(FT Person of the Year award)的同时，发表了有关波音(Boeing)的社论。 今年的候选人是微软公司(Microsoft corp.)的首席执行官萨蒂亚 · 纳德拉(Satya Nadella)。
Mr. Nadella has set a standard in developing the new culture of Microsoft, one “that would involve constantly being open to learning and new ideas, rather than the ‘fixed mindset’ of the past.”
纳德拉先生为发展微软的新文化树立了一个标准，这个标准“包括不断地接受学习和新思想，而不是过去的‘固定思维’。”
This is the essence of the new era. The way that information has grown and spread, corporations cannot live in the past, even if the past is only a short time ago.
这就是新时代的精髓。 信息增长和传播的方式，企业不能生活在过去，即使过去只是很短的时间。
Companies, like Boeing, and, to add another to this list, General Electric (NYSE: GE) fought to protect their past. They fought to keep quiet about what they were doing and where the problems might be, even excluding their board of directors. Their intellectual capital was theirs and management wanted to release as little information about anything… to anyone else.
像波音和通用电气这样的公司为了保护自己的过去而奋斗。 他们竭力对自己在做什么以及可能出现的问题保持沉默，甚至将董事会排除在外。 他们的智力资本是他们自己的，管理层只想向任何人透露很少的信息。
This was the culture of maximizing shareholder wealth based on a given technology.
这是一种基于给定技术的股东财富最大化的文化。
But, the world has changed. With new generations of technology being developed every three to five years, the “new” Modern Corporation must run a continual process of learning and dealing with new ideas.
但是，世界已经改变了。 随着每三到五年新一代技术的发展，“新型”现代企业必须不断学习和应对新思想。
If the corporations don’t build a culture that is open to learning and new ideas, to new information, it is going to fall behind, or, it is going to create situations like Boeing… or, like General Electric… where crises build up so that, sooner or later, the system breaks down.
如果企业不建立一种对学习和新思想、新信息持开放态度的文化，它就会落在后面，或者，它就会造成波音这样的局面… 或者，像通用电气这样的局面… 危机不断累积，导致系统迟早会崩溃。
Yes, these companies maximized shareholder value in the short-run, but failed to create the culture that could sustain this success over the longer-run. Their culture did not produce the information necessary to determine where problems were. Their culture was not built upon engineering excellence, but on producing short-term results.
是的，这些公司在短期内实现了股东价值的最大化，但未能创造出能够在长期内维持这种成功的文化。 他们的文化没有产生必要的信息，以确定问题在哪里。 他们的文化不是建立在卓越的工程技术上，而是建立在产生短期效果上。
The culture of these organizations was not sustainable.
这些组织的文化是不可持续的。
But, isn’t this what the leader of a corporation is supposed to do? Isn’t the top person in the organization supposed to sustain the company over time.
但是，这难道不是一个公司的领导者应该做的吗？ 难道组织里的最高层不是应该随着时间的推移来维持公司的发展吗。
Satya Nadella is being recognized because he has changed the culture of Microsoft, aiming for sustainable technological performance over time.
萨蒂亚 · 纳德拉之所以得到认可，是因为他改变了微软的文化，致力于随着时间的推移实现可持续的技术性能。
And, while he has been accomplishing this, Microsoft stock has risen in value to return the company to the top levels in terms of wealth creation.
而且，在他完成这一目标的同时，微软的股价已经上涨，使该公司在财富创造方面回到了最高水平。
Engineering excellence depends upon the creation of a culture that values the flow and spread of information.
卓越的工程取决于创造一种重视信息流动和传播的文化。
In value investing, this is what the investor must be looking for. Creating shareholder value in the short run is great, but the investor must be comfortable with the corporate culture that the CEO is creating or has created, in order to justify an investment over the longer term.
在价值投资中，这是投资者必须寻找的。 短期内为股东创造价值固然重要，但投资者必须对 CEO 正在创造或已经创造的企业文化感到满意，以便在长期内证明投资的合理性。
Mr. Muilenburg, CEO of Boeing, failed to do this. Lots of people are now paying for this shortcoming, a situation that could exist and/or expand for some time. The question now is how will Boeing be turned around? How will a new culture be built?
波音公司的首席执行官穆伦堡先生没有做到这一点。 许多人现在正在为这个缺点付出代价，这种情况可能会存在和 / 或扩大一段时间。 现在的问题是，波音公司将如何扭转颓势？ 如何建立一种新的文化？
As the editorial in the Financial Times concludes: “Boeing will survive this crisis-it needs to ensure trust in its products does too.”
正如英国《金融时报》的社论所总结的那样: “波音将度过这场危机——它也需要确保人们对其产品的信任。”
Operating within an open and transparent environment in the future can help Boeing build up this trust over time. Investors need to insist that they create such a culture.
未来在一个开放和透明的环境中运营可以帮助波音逐渐建立这种信任。 投资者必须坚持要求他们创造这样一种文化。